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Introduction
The view that competition and entry should promote efﬁciency and
prosperity has now become a common wisdom worldwide. However,
looking back only forty years, one ﬁnds a very different consensus
among economic observers and policymakers. Latin American coun-
tries were pursuing import substitution policies, which allowed coun-
tries like Peru, Brazil, or Mexico to double their per capita GDP levels
relative to the United States between 1945 and the early 1970s.1 South-
east Asian countries and Japan were emphasizing export promotion
and proactive industrial policies, which allowed them to grow at an
annual growth rate of above 6 percent on average until the mid-1990s.
Finally, European countries had granted legal monopolies to large do-
mestic ﬁrms yet were rapidly catching up with U.S. productivity levels
up until the early 1980s.
But these positive growth trends did not last. Latin American coun-
tries experienced chronic instability and stagnation from the 1970s on-
ward. Growth in European Union (EU) countries petered out from the
1980s, with per capita GDP stuck at 70 percent of the U.S. level,2 and
growth performance recently deteriorating, both in absolute terms and
in comparison to the United States. Finally, since 1994 the Japanese
have faced a deep and prolonged recession that has forced them to re-
consider their overall economic model.
Why then, under some circumstances, can high growth be main-
tained through more protectionist and entrenched policies, whereas
under other circumstances growth seems to require higher competition
and openness?
A tentative answer to this question, recently put forward by Acemo-
glu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2003) and inspired by the work of Ger-
schenkron (1962), is that there is not one but several engines of
growth, which do not require the same institutions or policies. In lessdeveloped or middle-income countries, growth relies heavily upon
factor accumulation (investment in physical capital, labor, and human
capital or education) and upon imitating or adapting technologies
from more advanced countries. Both factor accumulation and imita-
tion can prosper under limited competition and entry (this relates to
the well-known infant-industry argument). However, in advanced
knowledge-based economies, where the growth potential of factor ac-
cumulation and imitation have been exhausted, frontier innovation
becomes the main source of growth. To the extent that frontier innova-
tion may require open markets and free entry, then countries should
move from less competitive to more competitive institutions in order
to sustain high growth rates throughout the various stages of their de-
velopment process.
But are we so sure that competition always favors innovation in
developed economies? In fact we often hear the opposite view being
advocated by prominent innovators—for example, by Microsoft over
the past ﬁve years—namely, that tough competition discourages inno-
vation and inhibits productivity growth by reducing the expected rents
from innovation (economists call this a ‘‘rent dissipation’’ effect of com-
petition). If, as an entrepreneur, I anticipate future antitrust action, or
future liberalization of entry in my market, why should I invest so
much in new innovations if the rents from these are to be destroyed by
new entrants or potential competitors? On the other hand, antitrust
practitioners and competition authorities argue that competition is a
necessary input into innovation, both because it encourages new entry
and because it keeps incumbent ﬁrms on their toes and forces them to
innovate in order to survive competition. So, who is right and who is
wrong? Can one turn to economists for clear and deﬁnite views on this
debate?
The answer is no. While competition features prominently in the his-
tory of economic thought, it is fair to say that economists still have a
limited, and sometimes contradictory, understanding of its economic
effects and, in particular, of the relationship between competition and
growth. What we have accumulated so far are only bits and pieces: on
the one hand, theoretical arguments that make predictions of either a
positive or negative relationship; on the other hand, contrasting pieces
of historical or empirical evidence. From this, a deep feeling of confu-
sion arises. The main purpose of this book is to provide the ﬁrst serious
attempt at putting the various pieces of the puzzle together into a uni-
ﬁed and coherent view of where and when one should expect competi-
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and when we should expect them to have only limited or even nega-
tive effects on growth. What weight should policymakers place on
rewarding successful innovation through granting monopoly power
versus enhancing the competitive pressures markets place on ﬁrms to
push forward the frontier? Is there really a trade-off to be made here,
or can these policies be used as complementary mechanisms?
This book takes the form of a dialogue between an applied theorist
and an econometrician. On the theory side, we build upon ‘‘Schumpe-
terian growth’’ models in which growth results from entrepreneurial
innovations. Innovative activities are induced by the economic envi-
ronment, and each new innovation destroys the monopoly rents gener-
ated by previous innovators. On the empirical side, we illustrate the
use of new techniques that have been implemented by applied micro-
econometricians to analyze the random process of innovation and
patenting and to develop adequate measures and instruments for com-
petition and entry. The dialogue between the theory and the econo-
metrics is one in which, at each round or chapter, (1) models are
systematically confronted with data, (2) the data either invalidate the
models or suggest changes in the modeling strategy, and (3) new pre-
dictions emerging from the modiﬁed models are again confronted by
the data, thereby initiating a new round of interaction between the
two sides.
In contrast to previous studies on competition, we deliberately focus
on the broad stance that competition policy should take. The volumi-
nous industrial organization (IO) literature details the welfare effects
of speciﬁc antitrust decisions, each emphasizing a different aspect and
pointing to speciﬁc effects in different directions. This book focuses on
the broader picture. For example, it can help governments in accession
countries understand how to both achieve the beneﬁts of tougher com-
petition, while also limiting the negative impact this may have in terms
of the dislocation of some sectors or industries. It also produces more
coherent policy advice, for example, on the design of patent protection,
proactive innovation policy, and competition policy as complementary
instruments to foster productivity growth.
We start in chapter 1 by reviewing the early theoretical and empiri-
cal literatures. Although highly segmented and often contradictory,
these provide foundations for our own approach. In particular, theory
pointed to a detrimental effect of competition on innovation and
growth, while the empirical literature instead suggested that more
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output, an idea that had much support in policy circles.
In chapter 2 we explore common wisdom, according to which com-
petition is mainly growth-enhancing because it forces ﬁrms to reduce
costs and innovate in order to survive. We ﬁnd that, while this Dar-
winian view of competition may account for the impact of competition
on some aspects of static efﬁciency, it is not fully vindicated by the
data and also does not fully explain the impact of competition on the
growth process.
In chapter 3 we explore an alternative route that allows us to both
unify the theory and reconcile it more fully with the empirical evi-
dence. We extend the Schumpeterian growth paradigm by distin-
guishing between pre-innovation rents and post-innovation rents, and
by introducing the notion that innovation is a way to escape com-
petition. More intense competition may lead to more innovation
because it reduces pre-innovation rents by more than it reduces post-
innovation rents. Whether this ‘‘escape competition’’ effect or the ‘‘rent
dissipation’’ effect dominates will turn out to depend upon technolog-
ical characteristics of a sector or industry. In particular, it will depend
on the technological distance between ﬁrms in that industry, and
which of these two effects dominates in the overall economy will
depend upon the distribution of technological characteristics across
sectors. Our analysis predicts an inverted-U relationship between
competition and innovation, and shows that the prediction is fully
consistent with the evidence.
In chapter 4 we introduce entry into the picture and look at the ex-
tent to which the effect of liberalizing entry on innovation and produc-
tivity growth depends upon the technological distance between the
domestic incumbent and the world technology frontier. Reducing bar-
riers to entry to foreign products and ﬁrms has an overall positive ef-
fect on innovation and productivity growth, but it has a more positive
effect on economic performance for ﬁrms and industries that are ini-
tially closer to the technological frontier. In contrast, performance in
ﬁrms and industries that are initially far from the frontier may actually
be damaged by liberalization. The reason is that incumbent ﬁrms that
are sufﬁciently close to the technological frontier can survive and deter
entry by innovating. In contrast, ﬁrms and sectors that are far below
the frontier are in a weaker position to ﬁght external entry. For these
ﬁrms, an increase in the entry threat reduces the expected payoff from
innovating, since their expected life horizon has become shorter. An-
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tion, has a central bearing on whether or not they beneﬁt from liberal-
ization. Thus, in relative terms, trade reforms hurt growth in regions
with pro-labor regulations, while enhancing growth in regions with
pro-employer regulations. These predictions are supported by empiri-
cal work in the United Kingdom, in India, and in cross-country analy-
sis. They suggest that, for example, accession countries may want to
have policies in place to foster the movement of labor out of industries
far below the frontier.
Fully self-contained, this book can be read by anyone with an
elementary acquaintance with basic economic principles and high
school–level algebra.
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